In this edition of Critical Minerals, Peter Hütte analyzes the delta between ambition and reality given the dearth of American mining capabilities on a global scale.
The Trump administration wants American firms to lead efforts to secure critical minerals abroad. This prompts two considerations:
- For US policymakers: To meet strategic goals, Washington may need to adopt a more expansive definition of eligibility – supporting firms from allied nations or those willing to align more closely with US interests.
2. For mining companies: Restructuring operations to qualify as “American” – through US incorporation, attracting US investors, or adapting board composition – could unlock access to financing, diplomatic support, and regulatory facilitation.
These implications stem from a structural tension: The US is devising a foreign-facing minerals strategy but lacks the industrial base to support it.
In the 1980s, US-based mining firms dominated the global mineral supply chain, backed by American capital and diplomatic reach. Since then, consolidation and offshoring have gutted the US mining sector. Today, only two US-based companies – Freeport and Newmont – rank among the top 30 global mining companies by market capitalization.
The administration’s willingness to deploy financial and diplomatic capital to secure critical minerals abroad is apparent. In January, President Trump signed Executive Order 14154, directing federal agencies to propose ways to “enhance the competitiveness of American mining and refining companies” in other mineral-rich countries like Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In March, Washington expanded mandates for the Development Finance Corporation and Export-Import Bank to improve financing and de-risk investments in critical minerals at home and abroad. In April, it signed a minerals deal with Ukraine that envisions a stronger role for US companies in developing and accessing Ukraine’s natural resources. While these moves reflect growing ambition, they exceed current capacity. Given the industry’s contraction in recent decades, it remains unclear which US firms can deliver on the Trump administration’s mandate.
Washington faces a narrow field of potential partners. The most active firms in mineral-rich regions today are Canadian, Australian, British, and Chinese, or from emerging markets like Brazil or India – companies from countries with varying alignment to US objectives, and often ineligible to operate within the current US policy regime.
Early-stage and mid-tier US operators previously focused on domestic refining are well-positioned to fill the glut. But unlike global majors that may benefit from diplomatic backing and have the capital to operate independently, these firms typically require significant financial and technical support from the government. Moreover, their small scale, longer development timelines, and higher risk profiles raise questions about their ability to address US vulnerabilities in a commercially viable way.
Our conversations with policymakers and executives in the US, Australia, Canada, and other jurisdictions indicate that they are just beginning to consider the two approaches outlined above, and we will be closely tracking how these trends play out in the months and years to come.